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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we examine whether Economic Value Added (EVA
TM
) is a good predictor of shareholder 
value creation (SVC) for a group of Latin American companies. We also examine whether EVA
TM
 is a 
better predictor of SVC than competing accounting-based measures of managerial performance. The 
relationship of these predictors to SVC is paramount in a study of factors influencing shareholder 
value creation such as the compensation of a firm’s executives. Our results show strong correlations 
between EVA
TM
 and SVC. They also indicate that EVA
TM
 outperforms competing measures even after 
controlling for the potential effects that these last metrics have on SVC. Moreover, they reveal different 
levels of SVC sensitivity to changes in EVA
TM
 across countries and significant differences in EVA’s 
association with SVC across industries. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
conomic Value Added (EVA
TM
) is increasingly replacing traditional accounting measures for evaluation 
of both value creation and executive compensation plans in U.S. companies.  Coca-Cola, AT&T, Quaker 
Oats, Briggs & Stratton, and CSX are some companies that use EVA
TM
 as a managerial performance 
measure.  However, there is a paucity of empirical studies evaluating the advantages of EVA
TM
 over other 
accounting measures when it comes to explaining shareholder value creation (SVC) for either pooled-
country companies or industrial sectors within a given country.   
 
  In this paper we evaluate the effects of EVA
TM
 on SVC. More specifically, we evaluate whether EVA
TM
 is a 
better predictor of SVC than other accounting measures such as net income and operating cash flow in two 
configurations, pooled-country companies and industrial sectors during an eight-year period (1994-2002). To 
accomplish this evaluation, we studied firms in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. The selected companies are the 
most equity capitalized within each country and belong to a variety of industrial sectors such as agriculture, commerce, 
food-beverage, electric power, mining, steel-metallurgy, vehicles, and telecommunications. This industrial array 
provides a rich field in which to perform our evaluation.  
 
  Our research differs from studies previously published in the financial literature in at least two relevant ways. 
First, previous investigations concentrated primarily on U. S. companies, despite the fact that the increasing 
internationalization faced by multinationals and local companies has raised similar issues in emerging economies.  
Undoubtedly, both types of companies need to be aware of and familiar with the emerging approaches for executive 
compensation and the effects these approaches have on companies’ financial and stock market performance. In fact, 
many companies in emerging economies are adopting economic-based performance measures such as EVA
TM
 to drive 
an effective executive compensation mechanism to incentivate SVC. 
 
  Second, few authors have formally studied the statistical relationship between EVA
TM
 and abnormal return 
(Bacidore et al., 1997), a stock market measure of SVC, which accounts for the difference between realized and 
required returns generated from some assets’ pricing specification. Bacidore et al. (1997) analyzed the above 
relationship, but they studied only U. S. companies, thus the empirical evidence describing this relationship in 
emerging Latin American economies is rather scarce. Other than Sandoval’s (2001) study of Chilean firms and their 
E 
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industries, no international studies have been published that enable a comparison of results among emerging Latin 
American companies and their industrial sectors. 
 
  We first compare the explanatory power of EVA
TM
 against competing accounting measures for the period of 
1994-2002, before and after controlling for the last metrics. Having identified the best measure for predicting SVC, we 
examine cross-country and cross-industry differences by pooling and comparing company data across countries and 
across industries.  
 
  The following section reviews previous studies of financial performance measures and their relationships with 
stock price and abnormal returns. The next section presents the methodology used including the measurement of SVC, 
the sample used, and the methods of analysis. The last sections present and discuss the empirical findings, conclusions, 
and suggestions for future research.  
 
MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
 
  Neoclassical theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, 1963) assumes that managers make decisions that 
maximize shareholders’ wealth. In practice, however, shareholders must monitor management decisions to ensure that 
executives opt for decisions that are in line with shareholder interests. When problems arise, owners typically incur 
expenses to monitor costs so as to keep management’s performance incentives in line. In doing so, however, owners 
who want to be sure that management behaves according to the owners’ interest may find themselves confronting a 
trade-off between monitoring costs and compensating executives.  
 
  It is assumed that when managers receive compensation contracts that align the increase of their own wealth 
to that of company shareholders, they will make decisions closely aligned with shareholders’ interests. The question is: 
which management performance measure is the most adequate for a contract to be effective. Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) and Milbourn (1996) argue that the best performance measure is the stock price itself. Stock prices or returns 
based on stock prices, however, may not be effective measures because they are exposed to and influenced by factors 
beyond management’s control.  
 
  Treatment of previous problems with stock-based compensation when used as a mechanism for better 
aligning managerial interests with those of shareholders shows that stock-based compensation is effective because 
insiders and outsiders systematically evaluate a CEO’s performance. Thus, a “good” management performance 
measure, when used as mechanism for executive compensation, can be expected to have a high correlation with 
shareholder wealth.  Moreover the measure will not be affected by the “randomness” associated with a firm's stock 
price determination.  
 
Economic Value Added (EVA
TM
) 
 
  A relatively new measure, Economic Value Added (EVA
TM
) was introduced to solve problems associated 
with stock-based managerial compensation. This metric, first suggested by Stern Stewart Management Services 
(Stewart, 1991), is a measure of surplus value created once the firm has been able to cover all its costs of capital, and it 
links the firm’s accounting data to its stock market performance (Stewart, 1991). Formally EVATM is defined as   
 
EVA = NOPAT - Kw(NA)                                                                                                                                             (1) 
 
where NOPAT is the net operating profits after taxes, Kw is the weighted-average cost of capital, and NA is defined as 
the adjusted book value of net capital at the beginning of the period.  
 
  An important issue associated with EVA
TM
 concerns its theoretical foundation: does it have one? Rogerson 
(1997) derived a theoretical model demonstrating that managerial investment incentives are affected by alternative 
allocation rules when managerial compensation is determined by accounting measures of income such as allocations 
for capital expenditures. Rogerson’s model assumes well-informed managers, risk-averse shareholders, and an 
investment decision process that maximizes the expected discounted cash flows. The main advantage of the model is 
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its unique allocation rule that motivates the manager to select an efficient investment level. The income measure 
created by this allocation rule is usually referred to as “residual income,” or economic value added (EVATM).  
 
  Another advantage of EVA
TM
 is that when using residual income as a performance measure for managerial 
performance, it includes the cost of equity in addition to the cost of debt. Unlike market-based measures, such as MVA 
(Market Value Added), which don’t take into account the capital costs of the firm, EVATM also can be calculated at 
divisional level (Strategic Business Units) and it is essentially a residual flow that can be used for performance 
evaluation over time. Unlike accounting measures, such as EBIT (Earnings before interests and taxes), OCF 
(Operating cash flows), NI (Net income) and EPS (Earnings per share), EVA
TM
 is economic and is based on the idea 
that a company must over both the operating costs and the capital costs. Therefore, the increasing use of EVA
TM
 
measure would seem justified and promising. 
 
  In evaluating EVA
TM
, we observe that its sponsors have traditionally looked to see whether EVA
TM
 
dominates net income (NI) and operating cash flow (OCF) in relation to annual stock returns. A variety of empirical 
studies examine the relationship between EVA
TM
, alternative measures, and stock returns or firm values (Biddle, 
Bowen & Wallace, 1999; Chen & Dodd, 1997; O’Byrne, 1995; Peterson & Peterson, 1996). Biddle, Bowen & 
Wallace (1999), for instance, study 6,174 firm-years over the period 1984-1993 to evaluate the correlation between 
EVA
TM 
and stock prices. Their results show that EVA
TM
 does not fit the data better than traditional accounting 
earnings in relation to stock returns and firm values.  
 
  Sandoval (2001) points out that a central defect in these studies is the assumption that a high correlation 
between EVA
TM
 and stock price indicates that high EVA
TM
 investments are related to wealth changes. This assumption 
is negated by the possibility that a perfect correlation between EVA
TM
 measure and stock price can be accompanied by 
a significant but negative performance of the stock in the market. The rationale for the negation is found in the 
“benchmark” used to measure how well a stock performs in terms of creating value. Such insights offer a lesson: 
before analyzing the correlation between any performance measure and shareholders’ wealth, we should first find an 
appropriate measure to evaluate changes in their wealth. 
 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
 
  One asset-pricing model that has a theoretical basis and enables us to address the above issue is the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM), which focuses on securities’ equilibrium pricing process. Among other properties, any 
significant deviation from the CAPM equilibrium would indicate an abnormal return, which in turn is a measure of 
increase or decrease in shareholders’ wealth. An abnormal return shows the return that shareholders obtain in excess of 
earnings required on a stock given its systematic risk. If this excess return is positive, shareholders obtain more than 
their risk-adjusted opportunity cost of providing capital. Conversely, if this excess return is negative, they get less than 
their risk-adjusted opportunity cost. Therefore, a “good” financial performance measure should have a high correlation 
with abnormal stock returns.  
 
  Yet, empirical studies that examine the relationship between EVA
TM
 and abnormal returns for U. S. 
companies or companies in emerging economies are scarce. Basing their conclusions on results involving U. S. 
companies, Bacidore et al. (1997) conclude that EVA
TM
 correlates well with a proxy of abnormal returns defined as 
“Jensen’s alpha” (Jensen, 1968, 1969). These authors point out that SVC is generated by physical assets in place and 
strategies linked to a firm’s future business growth opportunities. They also note that both value creation drivers are 
appropriate in decision-making by a firm’s senior executives. But there is virtually no empirical research available on 
companies from emerging economies (particularly companies from Latin America) that would enable us to analyze 
EVA
TM
 to see whether it is a superior managerial performance measure oriented to SVC across markets or it is a 
superior managerial performance measure when industrial sectors within a given country are compared. 
 
The Importance of Abnormal Returns 
 
 Shareholders can obtain a return on a stock in two ways: through dividends and/or capital gains. In any period 
of time, t, the shareholder return for firm j can be defined as  
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Rjt = {Dj,t + (Pj,t - Pj,t - 1)}/Pj,t -1                                                                                                                                        (2) 
 
where Dj,t is the dividend paid during the period t - 1 to t and Pj,t is the stock price at the end of period t.  
 
A variety of factors affect Rjt, the most significant being the systematic risk of the investment, the interest 
rates, and the business “know how” of companies' managers. The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) involves the 
first two factors and shows the expected return on a stock investment as follows: 
 
E(Rj,t) = Rft + Bj{E(Rmt) - Rft}                                                                                                                                      (3) 
 
where Rft is the risk-free interest rate at time t. Bj is the firm j's beta, a measure of the firm's systematic risk. {E(Rmt) - 
Rft} is the expected equity market risk premium, generally measured as the long-run, average ex-post return on the 
market in excess of the risk-free interest rate.  
 
The CAPM is traditionally used as a benchmark to estimate the firm’s j abnormal return obtained in period t. 
Jensen (1968, 1969) proposed a measure in the literature known as Jensen's alpha to estimate the abnormal return as  
 
j,t = Rj,t - E(Rj,t)                                                                                                                                                             (4) 
 
where j,t measures the realized shareholder return in excess of the return required given the firm's systematic risk in 
any period t.  
 
 Thus, Jensen's alpha seems to be an adequate measure of shareholder value creation, even though in practice, this 
measure is used as a high benchmark to evaluate assets’ pricing performance. Since a company with a frequent positive 
Jensen's alpha is one that systematically produces shareholder value creation, it would be consistently "beating the 
stock market." However, firms that show this behavior are uncommon in the stock markets. 
 
Research Questions 
 
  From the above examination, we derive four research questions. First, does EVA
TM
 dominate accounting 
measures such as net income (NI) or operating cash flow (OCF) in association with quarterly abnormal returns for 
pooled-companies within each Latin American country under study?  Second, are past realizations of EVA
TM
, NI, and 
OCF significant predictors of future abnormal returns? Third, does EVA
TM
 maintain a high correlation with abnormal 
returns even after controlling for other accounting measures? Fourth, how well does this predictor correlate with 
abnormal returns by industrial sectors when taking into consideration the most representative industries within a 
country and after identifying the best predictor derived from the answer to previous question?  
 
EMPIRICAL STUDY USING LATIN AMERICAN COMPANIES AND INDUSTRIES 
 
  This study uses quarterly data for the period 1994-2002 taken from a sample of 203 Latin American 
companies comprising the most traded and equity capitalized companies in relevant industrial sectors. 
 
Measures and Methods of Analysis 
 
  To obtain the companies’ quarterly estimates of EVATM, net income, and operating cash flow, we estimated 
net operating income after taxes, book value of assets, market value of assets, and the weighted-average cost of capital 
(WACC). The data was obtained primarily from Economatica
TM
, Datastream, and MSCI databases.  Economatica
TM
 is 
a historical database, which tracks pricing, financial statements, company reports, and local news on Latin American 
firms. 
 
  All estimates were in U. S. dollars, which enables us to use a uniform currency to make comparisons across 
countries and industries. The market value of assets was estimated by adding the book value of long-term liabilities, 
book value of preferred stock, and the market value of equity. Book values were used for liabilities and preferred stock 
because market values for these variables were not available. The WACC was calculated as the weighted-average cost 
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of long-term liabilities, preferred stock, and equity where the weights used were the proxies available on the basis of 
our estimates of its market-based capital structure. To estimate a firm’s cost of long-term liabilities, we assigned a 
bond yield with similar debt risk class to each company’s corporate debt. The after-tax cost of long-term liabilities was 
estimated as the firm’s cost of long-term liabilities multiplied by one minus the marginal tax rate associated with each 
country under study. The cost of equity was estimated using the market model based on the CAPM. The cost of 
preferred stock was estimated as the average of the long-term liabilities and the cost of equity established by its 
theoretical risk class because market proxies for estimation were not available either. 
 
  To calculate the cost of equity, estimates of risk-free rate, expected market risk premium and firms’ beta were 
needed.  There is some empirical evidence that stock markets are not fully integrated (see Bekaert & Harvey, 1998; 
French & Poterba, 1991; Harvey, 1995; and Mittoo, 1992). Taking into consideration that stock markets are not fully 
integrated, we use a weighted-average between each Latin American stock market index and the NYSE index return as 
proxy for the market portfolio return. In addition, and given the infrequent trading problem in some Latin American 
stocks, firms’ betas were estimated using the AC method suggested by Dimson (1979) and, following the method 
proposed by Vasicek (1973), adjusted back toward their average values. 
 
  Because our final analysis is based on quarterly data, monthly data from previous series were used for further 
quarterly estimates. The yield of U. S. treasury bills with maturity of ninety days was used as a proxy for the risk free-
rate. For the expected market risk premium, historical moving averages of realized monthly market risk premiums 
from 1992 to the quarter prior to that under estimation were calculated. Companies’ betas were estimated individually 
based on monthly security and market returns following the same procedure used in estimating the expected risk 
premium. EVA
TM
 for each company was finally estimated using equation (1).  
 
Sample 
 
  Table 1 shows the number and distribution of Latin American companies by country, industrial sector, and 
equity market capitalization (EMC) at the end of 2002.  
 
 
Table 1 
Sample: Number And Distribution Of Latin American Firms By Country, Industrial Sector, And Equity Market 
Capitalization (EMC) At The End Of 2002 
Industry/Country Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico 
 Firms # Firms # Firms # Firms # 
Agriculture 2    
Food-Beverage  10 7 4 
Commerce    4 
Electric power  6 14  
Funds   16  
Mining    5 
Paper-Pulp  6   
Petroleum 2    
Chemistry 2    
Steal-Metallurgy 2 6 3  
Telecommunications 2  3  
Vehicles  8   
Others 11 38 37 15 
Total firms in the sample 21 74 80 28 
Firms’ EMC in the sample (1) 9,807 47,584 28,889 65,098 
Total firms/country EMC (2) 15,505 195,843 50,475 167,550 
Percentage (%) (1)/(2) 63.3 24.3 57.2 38.9 
   (1) and (2) are in billions dollars at the end of 2002. 
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  The twenty-one Argentinean companies in the sample represent 63.3% of Argentinean firms’ equity market 
capitalization at the end of 2002. The dominant industries are agriculture, petroleum, chemistry, steel-metallurgy, and 
telecommunications. In the case of Brazil, seventy-four firms account for 24.3% of Brazilian companies’ equity market 
capitalization at the end of 2002, and food-beverage, electric power, paper, steel-metallurgy, and vehicle making are 
the main industries. For Chile, eighty firms account for 57.2% of Chilean firms’ equity market capitalization at the end 
of 2002. Food-beverage, electric power, funds, steel-metallurgy, and telecommunications are the main industrial 
sectors. Finally, in Mexico, twenty-eight firms account for 38.9% of Mexican companies’ market equity capitalization 
at the end of 2002. Commerce, mining, and steel-metallurgy are the most relevant industrial sectors.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
  The presentation of results follows the order of the research questions and attempts to answer them. For the 
pooled-companies within each Latin American country under study, the first research question was: Does EVA
TM
 
dominate accounting measures such as net income (NI) or operating cash flow (OCF) in association with quarterly 
abnormal returns? The second question was: are past realizations of EVA
TM
, NI and OCF significant predictors of 
future abnormal returns?  
 
The first set of tests involves general least squared regressions (hereafter, GLS regressions) using pooled time 
series, cross-section data, as econometric technique. The regression is specified as follows:  
 
yit = it + ixit + it                                                                                                                                                          (5) 
 
where i shows cross-section units (Latin American companies in the sample: 21, 74, 80 and 28 for Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico, respectively) and periods t = 1, 2,........, 35 (from March '94 to September '02). y it is the CAPM-
based abnormal returns (equation (4)) of company i at time t. it is equal to the constant, which is assumed to be 
common for all pool members within each country. i is equal to the sensitivity measure of yit with respect to xit. xit 
shows alternative proxies for measures of management performance (current and lagged EVA
TM
, NI, OCF, 
respectively).it is a white noise error term. 
 
  Since variances within cross-section are expected to occur across time, we use White’s heteroskedasticity 
covariance method to estimate consistent standard errors of the regression coefficients. The measures of managerial 
performance were scaled to be consistent with abnormal returns, which are estimated as percentages. For EVA
TM
, the 
equity market value is used as a denominator since this measure is supposed to be directly associated with value 
creation for shareholders. For accounting-based measures such as net income (NI) and operating cash flow (OCF), we 
use the book value of equity and the book value of assets, respectively, as a denominator. 
 
First And Second Research Questions 
 
  Table 2 reports the results after running regression equation (5) on each current and lagged management 
performance measure for the Argentinean and Brazilian pooled-companies, respectively. For both countries, EVA
TM
 
shows a higher adjusted-R
2
 or “goodness of fit” than their accounting counterparts. It is important to note that in a 
multiple regression approach, the coefficient on lagged EVA
TM
 shows the sensitivity of abnormal returns to variations 
in lagged EVA
TM
, which are uncorrelated with current EVA
TM
. In a similar way, the coefficient on current EVA
TM
 
indicates the sensitivity of abnormal returns to variations in current EVA
TM
, which in turn are uncorrelated with lagged 
EVA
TM
. One implication of this analysis is that the coefficient on current EVA
TM
 shows how abnormal returns change 
with unexpected variations in current EVA
TM, where expectations are based on previous periods’ EVATM. Thus, the 
results for Argentina and Brazil would indicate that the market rewards unexpected increases in current EVA
TM
 but 
penalizes unexpected increases in lagged EVA
TM
. These results are also consistent with the notion that the market 
bases expectations about firms’ future profitability on the current period’s EVATM rather than on its past realizations.  
 
  Table 3 reports the results for the Chilean and Mexican pooled-companies. Again, we find that EVA
TM
 shows 
a higher adjusted- R
2
 than their competing accounting measures.  In addition, the results for Chile and Mexico seem to 
be qualitatively similar to those for Argentina and Brazil.  The market also rewarded unexpected increases in current 
EVA
TM
 and penalized unexpected increases in lagged EVA
TM
.   These  results  confirm  the  previous  finding  that  the  
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Table 2 
Abnormal Companies’ Returns As Explained By Current And Lagged EVA, NI And OCF Results  
For Argentinean And Brazilian Companies As A Pool, Respectively March 1994 Through September 2002 
(T-Statistics In Parenthesis) 
 
Variables/ 
Country 
Argentina Brazil 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant -0.024 -0.040  -0.095 -0.097 -0.097 
 (-1.699) (-1.699)  (-10.178)* (-11.787)* (-11.652)* 
Beta1 (EVAt) 4.794   0.420   
 (4.935)*   (3.636)*   
Beta2 (EVAt-1) -4.256   -0.386   
 (-4.424)   (-3.449)*   
Beta1 (NIt)  0.147   0.012  
  (2.085)*   (0.347)  
Beta2 (NIt-1)  0.097   0.018  
  (1.614)   (1.683)  
Beta1 (OCFt)   0.344   0.028 
   (0.305)   (0.447) 
Beta2 (OCFt-1)   1.848   -0.022 
   (1.938)**   (-0.374) 
Adjusted-R2 0.089 0.011 0.018 0.030 0.001 0.001 
  Note: The dependent variable is abnormal returns. Sample size (total panel observations) = 735 and 2590 for 
  Argentina and Brazil, respectively.  * Significant at the 1% level.  ** Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Table 3 
Abnormal Companies’ Returns As Explained By Current And Lagged EVA, NI And OCF 
Results For Chilean And Mexican Companies As A Pool, Respectively 
March 1994 Through September 2002 
(T-Statistics In Parenthesis) 
 
Variables/Country Chile Mexico 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant -0.035 -0.057 -0.055 -0.022 -0.057 -0.053 
 (-6.194)* (-5.875)* (-8.766)* (-2.589)* (-5.507)* (-3.017)* 
Beta1 (EVAt) 2.999   8.111   
 (3.214)*   (7.264)*   
Beta2 (EVAt-1) -2.882   -7.418   
 (-3.113)*   (-6.455)*   
Beta1 (NIt)  0.874   0.809  
  (1.709)   (5.345)*  
Beta2 (NIt-1)  -0.118   0.175  
  (-0.643)   (1.353)  
Beta1 (OCFt)   1.033   0.804 
   (1.988)*   (0.816) 
Beta2 (OCFt-1)   -0.119   0.099 
   (-0.301)   (0.103) 
Adjusted-R2 0.070 0.066 0.008 0.103 0.062 0.001 
Note: The dependent variable is abnormal returns. Sample size (total panel observations) = 2800 and 980 for 
Chile and Mexico, respectively.  * Significant at the 1% level.  ** Significant at the 5% level. 
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market bases its expectations about firms’ future profitability on the current period’s EVATM rather than on its past 
realizations. 
 
  Notice that even though the results across countries are qualitatively similar, the sensitivity to changes in 
current and lagged unexpected EVA
TM
 varies. Mexico presents the highest sensitivity (elasticity) to either current or 
lagged unexpected EVA
TM
. The coefficients are 8.1 and -7.4, respectively. The ranking continues with Argentina, 
Chile and Brazil, in that order, with coefficients of 0.42 and -0.39, respectively.  
 
Third Research Question 
 
  The third research question asked: Does EVA
TM
 maintain a high correlation with abnormal returns even after 
controlling for other accounting measures? Table 4 reports the results for pooled-companies associated with each Latin 
American country under study. Notice that these results show abnormal returns as explained by EVA
TM
 (current and 
lagged) after controlling for accounting-based measures (NI and OCF).   
 
 
Table 4 
Abnormal Companies’ Returns As Explained By Current And Lagged EVA After Controlling For NI And OCF 
Results For Argentinean, Brazilian, Chilean And Mexican Companies As A Pool, Respectively 
March 1994 Through September 2002 
(T-Statistics In Parenthesis) 
 
Variable/Country Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant -0.006 -0.036 -0.047 0.027 
 (-0.291) (-2.698)* (-3.915)* (0.978) 
Beta1 (EVAt) 5.741 0.717 2.901 9.226 
 (6.174)* (7.240)* (2.909)* (7.878)* 
Beta2 (EVAt-1) -5.040 -0.381 -2.872 -7.988 
 (-5.617)* (-3.726)* (-3.007)* (-7.340)* 
Beta3 (NIt) 0.262 0.015 0.898 0.877 
 (3.401)* (0.434) (1.696) (5.549)* 
Beta4 (OCFt) -0.936 -0.283 -0.840 -2.507 
 (-0.955) (-7.024)* (-1.164) (-3.301)* 
Adjusted-R2 0.117 0.050 0.133 0.175 
Note: The dependent variable is abnormal returns. Sample size (total panel observations) = 735, 2590, 2800 and 980 for Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico, respectively.  * Significant at the 1% level.  ** Significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
  According to Table 4, the adjusted- R
2
 increases after controlling equation (5), showing the effect that 
accounting-based measures have on abnormal returns in the companies-countries under study. However, EVA
TM
 
(current and lagged) retains a high explanatory power (between 53% for Chile and 76% for Argentina) when we 
compare the previous adjusted- R
2
 reported in Tables 2 and 3 with those reported in Table 4. On the other hand, the 
current and lagged EVA
TM
 continue being highly significant (with positive and negative coefficients, respectively) and 
their values do not show significant variations in the values reported in Tables 2 and 3. These results seem to validate 
EVA
TM
 as a dominant measure of managerial performance at the time value was created for Latin American 
companies’ shareholders. 
 
Fourth Research Question 
 
  The last research question asked: Taking into consideration the most representative industries within a 
country, and after identifying the best predictor derived from the answer to previous question, how well does this 
predictor correlate with abnormal returns by industrial sectors?  
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  To answer this question, we run similar regressions to those reported in Table 4. However, the new 
regressions are separated by country and industrial sector. Table 5 shows the results for Argentina, an EVA
TM
 
reflecting relatively higher adjusted- R
2
 in agriculture, steel-metallurgy, and chemistry. The remaining industrial 
sectors are under the general average value of 11.7% reported in Table 4. Thus, there are differences across 
Argentinean industries in terms of the effect that EVA
TM
 has on SVC.  
 
  Table 6 reports the results for Brazilian industrial sectors. EVA
TM
 shows relatively higher adjusted-R2 in the 
paper-pulp and steel-metallurgy sectors. The remaining industrial sectors are under the general average value of the 
5% reported in Table 4. However, the net income (NI) seems to be a more appropriate measure for managerial 
performance in the case of the electric-power industry (an adjusted- R
2
 of 51%). Again, we find differences across 
Brazilian industries in terms of the effect that EVA
TM
 has on SVC. 
 
  Table 7 shows the results for Chilean industrial sectors. EVA
TM
 presents relatively higher adjusted- R
2
 in 
funds, telecommunications, and steel-metallurgy. The remaining industrial sectors are under the general average value 
of the 13.3% reported in Table 4. Similar to the previous cases, we find differences across Chilean industries in terms 
of the effect that EVA
TM
 has on SVC. 
 
  Table 8 shows the results for Mexican industrial sectors. EVA
TM
 shows relatively higher adjusted- R
2
 in 
commerce and mining. The remaining industrial sectors under-perform the general average value of 17.5% reported in 
Table 4. Again, we find differences across Mexican industries in terms of the effect that EVA
TM
 has on SVC. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
  EVA
TM
 has been increasingly chosen by U. S. companies as an alternative to traditional accounting-based 
measures for both value creation in general and management compensation plans in particular. Yet, empirical studies 
seeking to determine whether EVA
TM
 outperforms other accounting measures associated with SVC for pooled-country 
companies or industrial sectors within a country have been scarce for both U. S. firms and firms from emerging 
economies such as those in Latin America.   
 
  This study addressed these issues with a focus on Latin American companies. We examined 203 companies 
from Argentina (21), Brazil (74), Chile (80) and Mexico (28). These companies comprise the most equity market 
capitalized firms in each country and belong to a variety of industrial sectors such as agriculture, food-beverage, 
commerce, electric power, funds, steel-metallurgy, and telecommunications. 
 
  Using general least-squared (GLS) regressions as an econometric technique, pooled time series, and cross-
section data, we found that EVA
TM
 predicts SVC and outperforms competing accounting measures in doing so, even 
after controlling for the potential effects that the last metrics have on SVC.  
 
  We also found two important differences across countries and across industries. First, we found differences in 
EVA’s sensitivity to SVC when companies within each country are jointly analyzed as a pool. More important, we also 
found significant differences across industries. In Argentina, EVA
TM
 presents a relatively higher explanatory power for 
value creation in agriculture, steel-metallurgy, and chemistry. In Brazil, the same phenomenon is observable in paper-
pulp and steel-metallurgy. In Chile, the results are similar in funds, telecommunications, and steel-metallurgy. Finally, 
in Mexico, EVA
TM
 shows better results in commerce and mining.  
 
  Thus, the use of EVA
TM
 as a mechanism to compensate a firm’s executives is a good predictor (a better 
predictor, when compared to competing measures) of SVC across countries and industries in Latin America.  
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Table 5 
Abnormal Companies’ Returns As Explained By Current And Lagged EVA After Controlling For NI And OCF 
Results For Argentinean Industrial Sectors 
March 1994 Through September 2002 
(T-Statistics In Parenthesis) 
 
Variable/Country Agriculture Petroleum Chemistry 
Steal-
Metallurgy 
Telecom. Others 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant -0.001 0.031 0.040 0.082 -0.121 0.024 
 (-0.007) (0.388) (0.371) (1.420) (-0.448) (0.649) 
Beta1 (EVAt) 7.252 10.617 5.604 10.256 6.971 5.235 
 (11.568)* (1.675) (1.936) (3.166)* (0.436) (4.248)* 
Beta2 (EVAt-1) -7.217 -8.116 -4.277 -9.223 -3.543 -3.658 
 (-18.951)* (-1.208) (-2.334)** -(2.973)* (-0.464) (-3.807)* 
Beta3 (NIt) 0.2600 -0.652 0.359 0.928 0.043 0.221 
 (0.426) (-0.624) (2.225)** (2.752)* (0.173) (2.278)** 
Beta4 (OCFt) -6.231 0.401 -0.310 -4.300 2.040 -2.700 
 (-3.027)* (0.150) (-0.114) (-1.172) (0.179) (-1.937) 
Number of companies 2 2 2 2 2 11 
Sample size 70 70 70 70 70 385 
Adjusted-R2 0.673 0.080 0.117 0.125 0.060 0.090 
* Significant at the 1% level.  ** Significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
Table 6 
Abnormal Companies’ Returns As Explained By Current And Lagged EVA After Controlling For NI And OCF 
Results For Brazilian Industrial Sectors 
March 1994 Through September 2002 
(T-Statistics In Parenthesis) 
 
Variable/ 
Country 
Food-
Beverage 
Electric-
Power 
Paper-Pulp Steal-
Metallurgy 
Vehicles Others 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant -0.009 -0.131 -0.001 -0.047 -0.012 -0.025 
 (-0.209) (-0.619) (-0.030) (-0.976) (-0.295) (-1.269) 
Beta1 (EVAt) 0.537 3.423 0.848 1.105 1.297 0.746 
 (2.870)* (2.692)** (2.941)* (3.461)* (2.648)* (5.803)* 
Beta2 (EVAt-1) -0.273 -3.130 -0.393 -0.870 -0.515 -0.338 
 (-1.182) (-2.343) (-1.593) (-2.469)** (-0.964) (-2.925)* 
Beta3 (NIt) 0.075 44.443 1.374 0.086 0.060 -0.026 
 (0.683) (1.340) (3.103)* (1.274) (0.626) (-2.626)* 
Beta4 (OCFt) -2.419 -30.327 -0.268 -0.122 -0.677 -0.337 
 (-2.016)** (-0.930) (-1.224) (-0.661) (-2.187)** (-5.999) 
Number of companies 10 6 6 6 8 38 
Sample size 350 210 210 210 280 1330 
Adjusted-R2 0.046 0.510 0.080 0.076 0.037 0.043 
* Significant at the 1% level.  ** Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 7 
Abnormal Companies’ Returns As Explained By Current And Lagged EVA After Controlling For NI And OCF 
Results For Chilean Industrial Sectors 
March 1994 Through September 2002 
(T-Statistics In Parenthesis) 
 
Variable/Country Food-
Beverage 
Electric-
Power 
Funds Steal-
Metallurgy 
Telecom. Others 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant -0.089 0.087 -0.093 0.137 0.296 -0.035 
 (-4.290) (1.732) (-2.519)** (1.549) (2.446)** (2.647)* 
Beta1 (EVAt) 0.051 9.775 4.964 13.158 21.077 1.895 
 (0.187) (5.313)* (3.582)* (3.973)* (4.816)* (3.939)* 
Beta2 (EVAt-1) -0.166 -6.612 -5.436 -9.734 -14.064 -1.889 
 (-0.556) (-4.321)* (-3.739)* (-3.112)* (-3.962)* (-4.301)* 
Beta3 (NIt) 0.539 0.503 1.847 1.375 4.268 0.259 
 (1.474) (5.470)* (2.130)** (2.696)* (2.607)** (1.881) 
Beta4 (OCFt) 0.944 -5.353 -0.863 -8.519 -17.449 -0.486 
 (0.977) (-3.188)* (-1.055) (-2.800)* (-2.768)* (-0.978) 
Number of companies 7 14 16 3 3 37 
Sample size 245 490 560 105 105 1295 
Adjusted-R2 0.022 0.120 0.435 0.175 0.357 0.052 
* Significant at the 1% level.  ** Significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
Table 8 
Abnormal Companies’ Returns As Explained By Current And Lagged EVA After Controlling For NI And OCF 
Results For Mexican Industrial Sectors 
March 1994 Through September 2002 
(T-Statistics In Parenthesis) 
 
Variable/Country Food-Beverage Commerce Mining Others 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 0.119 0.112 0.095 -0.035 
 (1.700) (1.956) (0.994) (-0.750) 
Beta1 (EVAt) 10.256 10.465 12.744 9.150 
 (3.772)* (5.656)* (5.757)* (3.005)* 
Beta2 (EVAt-1) -4.759 -7.225 -10.447 -9.584 
 (-2.078)** (-4.167)* (-4.012)* (-3.773)* 
Beta3 (NIt) 2.738 4.184 1.562 1.517 
 (4.318)* (4.908)* (3.773)* (3.444)* 
Beta4 (OCFt) -6.812 -10.140 -4.641 -2.100 
 (-3.570)* (-5.331)* (-2.037)** (-1.391) 
Number of companies 4 4 5 15 
Sample size 140 140 175 525 
Adjusted-R2 0.165 0.371 0.269 0.081 
Significant at the 1% level.  ** Significant at the 5% level. 
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